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Making Chile Visible: Purposes, Operationalisation and Audiences from the Perspective of Nation Branding Practitioners

Abstract

Chile has become the paradigm of nation branding in Latin America, employing branding initiatives to try to shake off the uncomfortable past of Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship, as well as to create a 'new' image that fits into a globalised and neoliberal world. Whilst there has previously been some analysis of Chile's branding efforts, the viewpoints of the local actors involved in these initiatives have largely been ignored. This article addresses this issue, examining the tensions faced by different individuals who have taken part in nation branding in the country. Drawing on interviews with some of these individuals, this article examines three areas of tension: (1) the conflicting purposes guiding the practice of nation branding, (2) the difficulties around the operationalisation of nation branding and (3) the controversies regarding the intended audiences for their efforts.

Introduction

In September 2008 I joined –along with five other colleagues– Ogilvy Public Relations Chile to work as an account executive on a new and ambitious project to promote Chile abroad. The stakes were high and exciting. Our client, the Export Promotion Bureau ProChile, told us that, although located in a peripheral or semi-peripheral geopolitical position,¹ Chile was a country with great potential, with resources such as stunning geography, political stability and high quality food exports, as well as a good economic performance since the mid-1980s. We were informed that Chile was invisible to most people, and that such invisibility was detrimental to Chile's future economic prospects. Consumers were unaware of the strength of Chilean exports and investors did not have enough information about the opportunities offered by the country. We had been hired to change that. As part of the newly formed *Proyecto Chile –Imagen País* (Chilean National Image Project), we were responsible for implementing a strategy to make Chile better

known in seven countries considered ‘priority markets’: the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Mexico, Japan and China.

The strategy was guided by the nation branding hexagon proposed by British consultant Simon Anholt,² who had been recently hired by the Chilean government. The hexagon focuses on six indicators of a national brand: exports, governance, investment and immigration, culture and heritage, people and tourism.³ Using those indicators as guides, we organized press trips for foreign journalists and bloggers; we sought potential stories that could portray Chile in a positive light for international news media, and we proudly highlighted the fact that *Quantum of Solace*, then the most recent James Bond movie, had been partially filmed in Chile. The project was supposed to last several years and incorporate more ‘priority markets’ over time. However, only six months later it was over. A new private but publicly funded organisation, *Fundación Imagen de Chile* (Image of Chile Foundation), had been created to develop and manage a narrative designed to make Chile more visible all over the world.

Although short-lived, my experience working at Ogilvy Public Relations Chile marked the beginning of a personal journey. Over the next two years I worked on two smaller projects promoting specific characteristics of Chile abroad, before starting to critically engage with this topic from an academic viewpoint. It also signalled the beginning of a series of public debates among local politicians, businessmen and authorities about how to construct and project abroad a positive national image or *marca país* (‘country brand’ in Spanish, the term locally used to refer to nation branding).⁴ Such brand did not intend to merely encompass a territory, but also a set of political, economic and cultural characteristics that allegedly made Chile unique. Significantly, it was claimed that a good brand had the supposed potential of improving Chile’s position in the international arena. Hence, concerns about Chile’s international reputation were predominantly framed as discussions about nation branding. Various domestic episodes –such as the earthquake of March 2010, the rescue of 33 Chilean miners in October 2010 and the performance of the

national football team in several sporting tournaments– were evaluated in terms of their potential to positively or negatively affect the ‘Chile brand’.⁵

Despite the social, political and economic significance attached to nation branding in Chile, which has been noticed by foreign observers,⁶ the viewpoints of the actors behind local nation branding initiatives have been largely neglected.⁷ Early nation branding studies –both critical works as well as those aimed at practitioners– were dominated by case studies from the United States and Western Europe. The global spread of nation branding led various authors to examine examples from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe.⁸ Latin America was predominantly ignored in the literature. Whilst recent studies have paid attention to the region,⁹ they have mostly provided an analysis of media coverage, documents and specific campaigns. Therefore, this article seeks to address this neglected topic, shedding light on the tensions that some of the individuals constructing and projecting a particular version of Chile through nation branding have faced for the last decade.

The discussion has five sections. The first looks at the theoretical aspects, and suggests that nation branding is a manifestation of Dijkink’s ‘geopolitical visions’.¹⁰ Hence, I argue that the concept of visibility is particularly useful for analysing the purposes, operationalisation and intended audiences of the individuals involved in nation branding. The historical context is then considered to further understand the emergence and embrace of nation branding in Chile. I next examine the difficulties of making a single national brand visible to individuals and organisations with diverse and sometimes opposite goals. I outline then some of the tensions cited by practitioners in regard to the operationalisation of nation branding. Finally, I discuss some of the controversies they faced in relation to the audiences to whom direct their efforts.

Nation Branding, Geopolitical Visions and Visibility

Along with public diplomacy, nation branding is the most recent incarnation of the task of projecting a positive image of a nation abroad. Whilst there are competing definitions of what nation branding is, there is some consensus that it is the use of marketing and advertising techniques to enhance the reputation of a nation.¹¹ Since the late 1990s, governments from all over the world have spent hefty sums of money engaging in various initiatives that promise to re-build and project 'new' or 'updated' versions of national identity, in order to advance political, economic and or cultural agendas.¹² Nation branding advocates claim that the globalisation of capitalism and the spread of communication technologies made the international image or reputation of a nation as important as economic or military power.¹³ Van Ham argues that the increasing relevance of nation branding signals a shift from geopolitics and power to an emphasis on symbols and influences.¹⁴ Yet nation branding does not necessarily imply a complete departure from geopolitics. Rather, it introduces a new level of complexity for their analysis.¹⁵ Nation branding can be understood as a manifestation of what Dijkink calls 'geopolitical visions', that is, 'any idea concerning the relation between one's own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy'.

Whilst works for practitioners dominated the early nation branding literature,¹⁶ in recent times an increasing number of studies have addressed this phenomenon from a more critical viewpoint. Studies have drawn on theoretical concepts and perspectives from sociology, media and communications, anthropology, and international relations, among other fields.¹⁷ These analyses have made substantial contributions, highlighting how nation branding initiatives *commodify* national identity and craft a fairly homogenous version of the nation, which masks diversity and internal conflicts.¹⁸ In this article, I do draw on that critical literature. However, I depart from these works theoretically, proposing that the concept of visibility can be helpful when examining nation branding as geopolitical visions in practice. Approaching nation branding through the concept of visibility means taking into account not only the visible –campaigns, slogans, taglines,

videos—, but also the dynamism and nuance of the practices, perceptions and beliefs of the individuals behind nation branding efforts.¹⁹

The concept of visibility is often mentioned in the literature, for instance, when claiming that nation branding initiatives enable nations to ‘achieve greater visibility’.²⁰ However, it is rarely theorised. Only in the last fifteen years have various theorists and researchers from sociology, urban studies, gender studies, and media and communications focussed on scrutinising what visibility is and what its implications are. Thompson has studied how technological advances have contributed to the development of a ‘new visibility’, with the production of a greater number of images that can potentially achieve a wider geographical reach.²¹ Significantly, Thompson observes that visibility, particularly through the media, ‘has become a principal means by which social and political struggles are articulated and carried out’.²² Visibility has become a political concern,²³ ‘a right frequently and sometimes violently claimed; a right that all sorts of people feel entitled to obtain’.²⁴ Such perspectives understand visibility as a means to achieve political recognition and representation. Similarly, nation branding advocates claim that the visibility of the nation is not only a right, but a necessity.²⁵ Lacking a well-defined national brand means being left behind in the global competition for capital, tourism and political influence. The argument follows that governments must not only struggle for the visibility of the nation, but also control the terms of such visibility, *managing* its construction and projection to achieve their goal. Hence, nation branding proposes geopolitical ‘visions of order’ to maximise potential advantages and mitigate risks in the international arena.²⁶

Yet visibility is not merely a source of recognition, but also a form of surveillance. Being seen can be a way to be policed and subject to discipline and control.²⁷ Foucault famously stated that visibility was ‘a trap’²⁸ when writing about the Panopticon, a prison model in which inmates do not know whether or not they are being observed by guards. Furthermore, recognition and control are not in direct opposition to each other. They may in fact overlap. For instance, the development of a nation brand seeks to enhance

visibility, and at the same time to discipline the nation and its inhabitants into forms of behaviour suitable for the global market.²⁹ Hence, as Brighenti holds, ‘a way of seeing is a way of recognising and, at the same time, controlling’.³⁰

Despite the political implications of visibility, Banet-Weiser observes that practitioners and some theorists have increasingly shifted their attention from the *politics of visibility* towards the *economies of visibility*.³¹ Whilst the politics of visibility focus on how traditionally marginalised groups seek visibility as a *means* to produce further political – and geopolitical – change, the economies of visibility understand visibility as an *end in itself*. From this perspective, visibility is a way to facilitate the transaction of specific products –such as bodies, goods or, in this case, nation brands– in a market. When viewed from a predominantly economic perspective, questions about the purposes, modes of operationalisation as well as targeted audiences –the *what*, *how* and for *whom*– of those seeking visibility are often overlooked.³² Hence, a critical engagement with the concept of visibility may stress the (geo)political aspect of nation branding. Indeed, a thorough examination of visibility means addressing not only *what is seen* –logos, marketing campaigns, slogans–, but also sociocultural contexts, beliefs as well as the practices of the individuals taking part in the production of nation branding.³³ As Voirol observes, ways of doing are also ways of seeing.³⁴

The use of visibility as a theoretical framework highlights the need to scrutinise the discourses and viewpoints of the actors producing nation branding initiatives. The critical nation branding literature has increasingly addressed the perspectives of the individuals engaged in these initiatives in a series of settings.³⁵ Furthermore, as Kaneva suggests, nation branding studies should adopt a materialist perspective in order to ‘uncover the structural conditions and processes which underlie the ascendance of nation branding to a hegemonic status in contemporary international relations’.³⁶ Some of those conditions and processes are outlined in the next section, which provides some historical context to further understand the emergence and embracing of nation branding in Chile.

Context: Nation Branding in Chile

Whilst nation branding originated in the United Kingdom and the United States, elites from ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ nations –such as those from Latin America– have enthusiastically followed the advice of nation branding advocates and experts.³⁷ For the governments of Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Chile, among others, nation branding has represented a relatively cheap way to enhance the visibility of their nations abroad in order to favourably shape geopolitical visions. Local authorities have attempted to leave behind perceptions of exoticism, dictatorial governments, failed economies, or pre-modernity in order to attain political, cultural but mostly economic goals.³⁸ The positive reception of nation branding in Latin America has to be examined through the prism of broader historical processes. Despite various episodes of internal debate and contestation, nation building in Latin America was traditionally a top-down process. States constructed, fostered –often violently– and projected a sense of *homogeneous* national identity amongst heterogeneous and geographically dispersed peoples. Latin American states have tried to maintain control over specific versions and visions of what supposedly constitutes the *authentic* nations that they claim to represent.³⁹

In Chile, having secured independence from Spain in the early 19th century, local political and economic elites *selected* the representative features of the newly-formed nation, abandoning those considered undesirable.⁴⁰ Nation branding is compatible with these historical aspirations. Despite claims made by nation branding advocates about the need to involve the general population to identify the ‘core idea’ –or, using Dijkink’s terminology, the ‘collective mission’– of a nation,⁴¹ the final decisions regarding what constitutes the national brand are taken by a narrow group of individuals. It is expected that the rest of the population merely adapt to the decisions taken by elites, disciplining and adjusting their behaviour to contribute to the enactment of a national portrayal appealing to foreigners.⁴²

Attempts to construct a positive image of Chile for foreigners can be found in the 19th century. These attempts were primarily driven by economic goals. State-sponsored chronicles written by Chilean authors sought to attract potential Western European immigrants, in the hope that these immigrants would contribute to the development of the southern regions of the country. Publicly and privately funded campaigns promoting Chile abroad were pitched at increasing saltpetre sales. This mineral became one of the pillars of the Chilean economy at the end of the 19th century.⁴³ Yet the seeds of the current attempts to construct and project a version of Chile for foreigners can be found in the mid-1980s, when the local Export Promotion Bureau, ProChile, developed a campaign to boost exports to the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Japan and Singapore, through the depiction of Chile as an economically open and low-risk nation.⁴⁴ An emphasis on economic virtues, underpinned by the neoliberal turn taken by Chile in the late 1970s, aimed to counteract the political isolation faced during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.⁴⁵

With the end of Pinochet's dictatorship in 1990, Chile's new authorities attempted to project a fresh image of their country, to secure its re-entry into the global arena, ridding itself of any connection with the Pinochet regime. For the Seville Expo 1992, the Chilean pavilion had an iceberg as its main attraction. The iceberg attempted to differentiate Chile from the rest of Latin America, depicting the country as a cold, formal and serious.⁴⁶ Significantly, the new democratically elected Chilean government sought to distance itself from the previous regime in political terms, whilst keeping the same economic model.

In the mid-2000s, the Chilean government hired foreign marketing and advertising specialists to develop a proposal for a *marca país* or nation brand.⁴⁷ A motivation to create such a brand was the need to strengthen exports and increase investment in the light of several free trade agreements in negotiation, such as those with the United States and the European Union. As mentioned earlier, one of the advisors was Simon Anholt, the British branding consultant who coined the term 'nation-brands' –originally with a

hyphen– in the late 1990s.⁴⁸ In 2008, Anholt began work for the government of Michelle Bachelet. His hiring also resulted in the inclusion of Chile in Anholt's Nation Brand Index (NBI). Anholt travelled all over the country in a series of well-publicised encounters with local politicians, businessmen, academics and artists, where he stressed the urgent need to develop a national brand to surmount the supposed invisibility of Chile in the international arena.⁴⁹

In 2009 the Chilean authorities launched *Fundación Imagen de Chile* (Image of Chile Foundation), a private but publicly funded organisation to develop and sustain a narrative designed to make Chile more visible in the global imaginary.⁵⁰ Whilst officials working at the foundation have stressed that their work is for the long term, its active campaigns have reflected the concerns of the government in power. During the administration of Sebastián Piñera, who led the country between 2010 and 2014, the foundation developed the campaign 'Chile is good for you' – '*Chile hace bien*' in Spanish, which means *both* 'Chile is good for you' and 'Chile works well'–,⁵¹ which emphasised the country's political stability, stunning geography and the resiliency of its people. This campaign was scrapped with the return of Michelle Bachelet to the Presidency in 2014, and replaced by another one that did not have a specific slogan, which stressed Chile as a trustworthy country, moving towards progress, with a mixture of tradition and modernity and an extreme geography.⁵²

Notably, most of the features that have defined the global phenomenon of nation branding are present in the case of Chile: the need to shake off an uncomfortable past; the creation of a 'new' image which could fit into a perceived globalised, neoliberal world; the hiring of foreign experts for this task; and the development of new state-sponsored institutions that attempt to construct, enhance and manage the visibility of a particular version of the nation. Indeed, Chile has been considered a success story that should be imitated by other Latin American governments, such as Brazil.⁵³

A Methodological Note

As stated earlier, the viewpoints of the individuals engaged in nation branding in Chile have largely been neglected in the literature. To address this gap, I conducted seven semi-structured interviews with individuals who have taken part in the development and implementation of nation branding initiatives in Chile.⁵⁴ All of them worked for the main public and private organisations that have been involved in nation branding initiatives in the country during the last decade: Image of Chile Foundation, ProChile, Ogilvy Public Relations and FutureBrand. Some of the interviewees have worked in both the public and private sector at different times. The interviews were conducted in Spanish, between March 2013 and September 2016. All interviewees requested anonymity, as most of them have remained involved directly or indirectly in the implementation of nation branding. Hence, I have changed their names and I mention their affiliation –or previous– at the time of the interview. My contact with some of them was facilitated by the fact that, as mentioned earlier, between 2008 and 2010 I worked as an account executive for Ogilvy Public Relations Chile on different nation branding projects. Indeed, I experienced directly some of the issues raised by the interviewees, which are addressed later in this article.

I conducted a thematic analysis of the seven interviews to identify some of the main subjects raised by the informants and to examine how they understood these topics.⁵⁵ I do not claim that this is an exhaustive study with such a limited number of respondents. It should be seen as the starting point for wider debates about nation branding in Chile as well as Latin America. I grouped the topics from the analysis of the interviews into three interrelated areas that follow the previous theoretical discussion about visibility. The areas of tension address the purposes (the *what*), operationalisation (the *how*) and the intended audiences (*for whom*) of nation branding initiatives in Chile. More concretely, the topics I examine are: *What* was the image of Chile that the interviewees were trying to make visible through nation branding initiatives? *How* did they operationalize the construction and projection of such image? *To whom* were they trying to communicate that particular national brand?

Purposes: What Image of Chile should be made visible?

The first tension raised by the interviewees relates to the version of Chile that they tried to make visible. As discussed earlier, there have been various incarnations of nation branding in Chile, including the early attempts by ProChile in the mid 2000s, and the different campaigns carried out by the *Fundación Imagen de Chile* since its inception in 2009. Despite the differences in approaches and the different aims of the organisations involved in nation branding, all interviewees concluded that the main driving force behind nation branding was the attainment of economic goals.

All interviewees stressed that features such as political stability, stunning geography and the warmth of the Chileans were equally important, but were relevant insofar as they were beneficial for Chile's economy. Geography was important for tourism; political stability was required for foreign investment; and the character of Chileans mattered as evidence of a supposed entrepreneurial spirit. Interviewees agreed that their task was to portray Chile mostly as an economic unit, which produced raw materials, was suitable for foreign investment, and was an attractive tourist destination for foreigners. Fernando, from *Fundación Imagen de Chile*, observed that diplomats often instructed their embassy and consular communications teams to *sell* Chile abroad (personal communication, 2014). Such emphasis shows the previously discussed *economies of visibility* at play. Indeed, nation branding is a manifestation of what has been called 'commercial nationalism' or 'economic nationalism', that is, the primacy of economic practices as markers of nationhood, as well as the adoption of an economic viewpoint to evaluate the legitimacy of institutions.⁵⁶

Despite the consensus that Chile had to be shown primarily as an economic unit, different actors disagreed on the features that should be emphasised or masked in order to generate economic benefits. A former ProChile official and a former Ogilvy Public Relations Chile executive recalled that the first attempt to produce a nation brand for Chile was signalled by the adoption of the tagline 'Chile, All Ways Surprising' (*'Chile, Sorprende*

Siempre’ in Spanish), developed by the branding company InterBrand in 2005. The logo and respective tagline aimed to show a ‘new’ Chile, with stars that supposedly signalled not only the beauty of the Chilean sky, but most significantly, a continuously moving and innovative business oriented nation which respected its past.⁵⁷ The depiction of a nation as a mixture of tradition and modernity is far from original. The Janus-like face of nationhood, with ‘backward’ nations looking for stability in their past while at the same time embracing modernity,⁵⁸ has become a staple of nation branding campaigns all over the world.⁵⁹ Significantly, the excitement that the ‘All Ways Surprising’ campaign tried to communicate was soon subject to criticism within the government, which perceived it to have the potential to undermine the goals of various state agencies. As David, former official of ProChile, recalled:

That brand [Chile, All Ways Surprising] was launched amidst lots of hype. There was tons of stationery ready and so on, but after a couple of months, the Foreign Investment Committee asked ProChile to remove the tagline. They said that the last thing an investor was going to find attractive was a country full of surprises. They preferred a country that was predictable, reliable and boring. The surprises worked mainly for tourists. So we ended up keeping the logo with the stars, but the tagline was scrapped (personal communication, 2013).

David’s quote describes the supposed unsuitability of ‘All Ways Surprising’ to attract investment.⁶⁰ It is also illustrative of a phenomenon that was cited by most interviewees. Despite their agreement about the relevance of carrying out nation branding initiatives for the attainment of economic purposes, interviewees stressed the difficulty of coordinating the various public and private entities, with their own individual goals, when putting these initiatives into practice.

As mentioned earlier, the literature has examined how nation branding practitioners in various settings have faced several challenges –especially among themselves – when putting their initiatives into practice.⁶¹ Significantly The *Fundación Imagen de Chile* was created to coordinate nation branding work so mitigating controversies regarding Chile’s nation brand, but this proved difficult sometimes. Fernando, a former *Fundación* official,

recalled that during the global media frenzy after the 2010 rescue of 33 Chilean miners, the then President Sebastián Piñera wanted to change the campaign name ‘Chile is good for you’ to ‘Do it the Chilean way’ –the motto was in English language only–, which were supposedly Barack Obama’s words when discussing the successful rescue with Piñera. According to Fernando, various senior officials resisted Piñera’s efforts not only because ‘Chile is good for you’ was about to be launched, but also because they feared that ‘Do it the Chilean Way’ would become a source of parodies and jokes within Chile:

Can you imagine how people would have mocked that sentence every time something did not work? It could have been very harmful in the long term (personal communication, 2014).

The examples above highlight that, despite agreement about the supposed benefits of nation branding, harmony and coordination amongst the parties involved in these efforts are the exception rather than the rule. Hence, at the heart of nation branding lies a paradox: the promise to make visible a *single* and *coordinated* version of the nation, albeit with the involvement of individuals and organisations that actually have *diverse* and often *opposite* goals.⁶² Unsurprisingly, the promise of a coordinated version of the nation is rarely fulfilled. At best, it is possible to agree on making shallow statements. This is true for Chile’s current nation brand, which holds that the country has a diverse geography, a mixture of tradition and modernity, and people who are trustworthy and committed to progress.⁶³ These features are hardly exclusive to Chile. Indeed, most interviewees openly expressed their doubts about the possibility of constructing and managing the visibility of a coordinated image of Chile. At the centre of these doubts was the realisation that it was almost impossible to reach a complete consensus regarding national identity. As Marcela, a former *Fundación Imagen de Chile* official stated:

It is difficult to project outwards issues that have not been agreed internally. That is why I believe that the *Fundación* had a relevant role in bringing into the public domain the discussion about the kind of country that we are, where we want to go and what kind of future projects we have. And this narrative cannot be totalitarian, because there are spaces in which there simply is no agreement (personal communication, 2013).

This quote shows that finding the alleged ‘core idea’ or ‘collective mission’ of a nation, as encouraged by nation branding enthusiasts,⁶⁴ is, in practical terms, an extremely difficult and perhaps even unattainable task. Nonetheless, the recognition that agreement may be impossible does not necessarily result in enrichment of debates about national identity, as proposed by some critical authors.⁶⁵ As Marcela points out, in the Chilean case, discussions about what the nation is are still framed as a top-down process, managed by a state-sponsored organisation – ‘*the Fundación had a relevant role*’. Furthermore, the final decision of what supposedly constitutes –and what does not– the Chilean national identity made visible by the brand remains in the hands of the foundation. Hence, paraphrasing Dayan, variability is ‘accepted but only within limits’, in this case, the limits imposed by *Fundación Imagen de Chile*.⁶⁶

Operationalisation: How to Make Chile Visible?

The second source of tension highlighted by interviewees relates to the operationalisation of nation branding. Despite the abundance of literature aimed at practitioners,⁶⁷ the interviewees stated that there were no clear guidelines on how to implement as well as how to evaluate nation branding. I recall that, when working at Ogilvy Public Relations, we lacked clear instructions on how to empirically apply Anholt’s Nation Brand Hexagon.⁶⁸ Given that the standard practice amongst public relation practitioners in our team was to produce press releases and measure success monitoring media coverage, we used the six sides of the hexagon as thematic categories to propose potential news stories and to classify media monitoring of Chile. Hence, whilst we adhered to Anholt’s model – at least superficially–, our practices hardly explored any new grounds, given that we settled on an established set of procedures that the team felt comfortable with.

The literature often describes how nation branding practitioners, driven by commercial imperatives, increasingly make decisions about national identity that were previously made by the state.⁶⁹ However, the interviews showed that the operationalisation of nation branding and the prevalence of a commercial viewpoint were not entirely dependent on

practitioners. Outcomes such as slogans, videos or taglines were sometimes the product of political and financial pressures unrelated to purely promotional concerns. For instance, the 2010 launch of the previously mentioned campaign ‘Chile is good for you’ was marked by a promotional video uploaded to YouTube and broadcast in several European countries.⁷⁰ As Marcela, former *Fundación Imagen de Chile* official stated, that video –along with various other campaign outcomes – was primarily produced as a response to a particular set of political requirements and expectations seeking to justify the work and budget of the recently established foundation:

‘Chile is good for you’ was made because there was an expectation that the foundation had to deliver several products: a logo, a slogan and an important televisual advertisement. So it was begrudgingly that we produced a video in order to meet that expectation, do you understand? This is related to some political issues, regarding the distribution of the work between different state institutions, so it is not only about how you articulate Chile's communication strategy (personal communication, 2013).

As Marcela revealed, the state agencies funding the work of *Fundación Imagen de Chile* expected outcomes traditionally associated with branding and advertising, such as promotional logos and taglines. The fact that local politicians demanded precisely those outcomes reveals the level of dissemination and *normalisation* of the language and logics of branding and advertising within the state.⁷¹ Indeed, requirements such as those mentioned by Marcela are a manifestation of the increasingly popular adoption of corporate techniques by the public sector, spurred on by a growing demand for enhanced evaluation and measurement instruments, particularly concerning the reputation of organisations.⁷² Most interviewees also admitted that, despite the rhetoric of nation branding enthusiasts, there are no clear parameters to systematically measure and evaluate the development and management of the image of a nation. Hence, activities such as press report preparation, media coverage monitoring, and the production of advertising and marketing materials have become the *de facto* ways of evaluating and justifying the costs of nation branding initiatives. Significantly, although nation branding advocates claim that their goal is making the nation stand out in a global competitive

market, the fact that nation branding practitioners emulate their practices across various settings, makes the outcomes of these initiatives extremely similar all over the world.⁷³

Notably, some nation branding practitioners were explicit in their dissatisfaction with the language and format of advertising. Depictions using standard marketing language were described as ‘inauthentic’. Their criticisms were not isolated. Simon Anholt has become an outspoken critic of the practices and promises of nation branding, albeit only for the purpose of re-labelling his work as ‘competitive identity’.⁷⁴ According to Fernando, former *Fundación Imagen de Chile* official, the perfectionism of videos such as ‘Chile is good for you’ made difficult the visibility of the *authentic* nation:

The aesthetic and the audiovisual strategy of ‘Chile is good for you’ shows a stunning Chile, with unique landscapes, exceptional natural resources and food delicacies, while, for example, the documentaries of ‘Living Atlas Chile’ show the truth. I mean, salmon fishing is difficult and fishes are not that beautiful. So the ‘Living Atlas’ does not mean that we are ugly or anything like that, but it wants to show the truth, without a professional camera and that perfect advertising language (personal communication, 2014).

The ‘Living Atlas Chile’ (*Atlas Vivo de Chile*), mentioned above by Fernando, was a series of short documentary films produced by *Fundación Imagen de Chile* in 2013 that aimed to show the lives of *real* Chileans.⁷⁵ According to Marcela, who was involved in the development of the documentaries, the films attempted to enhance the visibility of ‘ordinary’ Chileans. Hence, the ‘Atlas’ intended to address one of the main drivers behind the country’s nation branding efforts, namely the fact that ‘no one can picture a Chilean’.⁷⁶ However, both Marcela and Fernando stated that officials within the foundation had heated discussions about the production of this series, due to, again, a lack of clarity regarding the approach to take and potential evaluation methods. Significantly, the different approaches taken on how to portray Chile in the ‘Living Atlas’ and ‘Chile is good for you’ led to the development of at least two parallel and disconnected accounts of the nation: one aimed at locals and one aimed at foreigners, both with radically different formats and messages. The invention of one single nation brand applicable across a variety of settings, and which could be embraced by both locals

and foreigners, proved to be an almost impossible task. In other words, the *poetics* of nation branding were halted significantly by the *politics* of its operationalisation.⁷⁷

Audiences: For whom should Chile be made visible?

The third and final tension highlighted by the interviewees refers to the audiences to whom nation branding efforts should be directed. The prevalence of the *economies of visibility* over the *politics of visibility* was particularly clear in this regard. Most interviewees did not speak of ‘audiences’, ‘publics’ or ‘countries’ to which nation branding initiatives had to be targeted. Instead, they spoke of ‘markets’. As mentioned in the introduction, that was the term employed when I worked in nation branding projects in the late 2000s. The reference to markets confirms that nation branding is a manifestation of ‘economic’ or ‘commercial nationalism’. Indeed, one of the promises made by nation branding advocates is the levelling of the international arena, namely, a redrawing of geopolitics. According to this argument, nation branding facilitates small and medium-sized nations located far from traditional power centres, and with limited material resources, to punch ‘above their weight’.⁷⁸ However, claims of empowerment and levelling the field are misleading, because nation branding rarely, if ever, challenges power relations in the international arena.

Nation branding does not merely aim to make visible the supposed *authenticity* –as long as it can be a source of profit– of a nation. As a manifestation of geopolitical visions, it also situates nations in specific places in the world, praising and criticising nations according to alleged universal parameters of behaviour and political and economic achievements.⁷⁹ That is the role of rankings such as the already mentioned Nation Brand Index (NBI) as well as the Country Brand Index (CBI) by FutureBrand,⁸⁰ to which the Chilean authorities have subscribed. In both indexes nations annually move upwards or downwards in the international arena, depending on how ‘well’ or ‘poorly’ their brand has performed. Significantly, the rankings demonstrate how visibility can be a source of both recognition and surveillance. Nation branding not only promises countries to be

recognised. It also seeks to discipline and control them, pushing them to embrace behaviours deemed as correct or desirable.⁸¹

Nation branding highlights the *asymmetry* of visibility relations among countries.⁸² Most nation branding consultants are based in the United Kingdom and the United States, with governments in the global south as clients.⁸³ Indeed, the aforementioned rankings promoted by consultants reinforce the idea that the world is divided into ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ nations between which unequal power relations exist.⁸⁴ The methodology used for the NBI and the CBI places much weight on interviews with individuals predominantly based in Western nations.⁸⁵ In turn, ‘peripheral’ or ‘emerging’ nations such as Chile end up targeting most of their nation branding efforts at ‘core’ ones, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany or Japan. Given the attention of ‘core’ nations is portrayed as a zero-sum game, nation branding advocates hold that competition for attention among nations is *natural*.⁸⁶ Hence, nation branding is also a manifestation of the *competition state*, with the aim of ‘maintaining and promoting competitiveness in a world marketplace and multi-level political system’.⁸⁷

Chile is ranked traditionally around number 35 of 50 nations in the NBI⁸⁸ and is often regarded as the fourth Latin American nation brand in the Country Brand Index of FutureBrand.⁸⁹ Whilst the stated aspiration of most interviewees was to gradually move Chile upwards to the top rankings, they admitted that this goal is probably going to take years or even decades to attain. Interviewees also recognised that most of Chile’s nation branding efforts were directed at ‘core’ nations from Western Europe and East Asia, as well as the United States. Whilst there have been specific campaigns targeted at audiences within the region⁹⁰ -and Marcela, former official at *Fundación Imagen de Chile* observed that ‘Juan Gabriel [Valdés, first Executive Director of the foundation] originally wanted to focus efforts on improving relations with Peru, Bolivia, and better position Chile in South America’ – Chile’s initiatives are rarely focussed on Latin America. Indeed, shortly afterwards the Chilean government announced in 2014 that

local nation branding efforts were going to include the continent,⁹¹ Carlos, an official from ProChile, stated:

I really don't like what they [at *Fundación Imagen de Chile*] are doing. We should be focussing on our markets, on our exports, and not on solving issues with our neighbours. That is an important issue, but I don't think we should currently direct the limited resources we have for nation branding to do that. There are other state departments that are much more experienced and can do it better.

Carlos admits that nation branding practitioners in Chile lack both the expertise and resources to deal with the fraught relationships with neighbouring countries. Similarly, Pedro, from Ogilvy Public Relations, held that Chile 'should not be eager to please everyone' (personal communication, 2014). Yet the country has a history of tense relationships with its neighbours, particularly Peru and Bolivia, due to conflicts that date back to the 'War of the Pacific' at the end of the 19th century. Indeed, in the last decade, both have taken Chile to the International Court of Justice to solve border disputes.⁹² Both Peru and Bolivia notably accompanied their legal efforts with communication campaigns that aimed to win public support for their legal arguments.⁹³ Chile was a latecomer in developing communication efforts, partly because its focus on using nation branding to advance an economic agenda led the country to enhance its visibility almost exclusively before the eyes of 'core' nations or 'priority markets'.⁹⁴

The tension between the *politics of visibility* and the *economies of visibility* are at the core of Chile's nation branding efforts. Nation branding advocates stress that a focus on the brand displaces the supposed aggressiveness of nationalism.⁹⁵ Yet nation branding is ill equipped to deal both with conflict and the more complex intricacies of regional politics. Despite its promises of redrawing geopolitics through the empowerment of small and medium-sized states, nation branding does not provide answers to more traditional geopolitical concerns, such as the territorial disputes affecting Chile. Indeed, the geopolitical vision proposed by nation branding initiatives, which predominantly places weight on economic concerns, have arguably encouraged Chile to relate mostly to 'core'

nations, to the detriment of most of Latin America. There are signs that the Chilean authorities are trying to correct this situation, engaging with other nations within the region.⁹⁶ Significantly, such efforts have been labelled as ‘public diplomacy’ rather than ‘nation branding’.⁹⁷ However, it is unclear whether or not these initiatives will be substantially different to nation branding ones. The boundaries between nation branding and public diplomacy are extremely blurred.⁹⁸ Hence, it can perfectly be the case that some of the shortcomings of nation branding previously discussed end up being reproduced, albeit under a different name.

Concluding Remarks

This article has examined the viewpoints of nation branding practitioners in Chile, a country that since the mid-2000s has carried out various initiatives to try to shake off the uncomfortable past of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, creating a ‘new’ image that fits into a globalised and neoliberal world. The case of Chile shows how nation branding is a manifestation of the struggles for visibility that characterise contemporary societies,⁹⁹ with nations competing to achieve recognition, while at the same time becoming subjects of external control.¹⁰⁰ Significantly, understanding nation branding within the prism of geopolitical visions and visibility, as suggested in this article, invites an examination not only of what can be seen –that is, the outcomes of specific campaigns–, but also of the beliefs and practices of the individuals behind nation branding efforts.

The interviews conducted for this article shed light on the complexity of nation branding, and some of its implications for the study of geopolitics, from an empirical perspective. They corroborated how nation branding is understood as a series of practices driven and framed by mostly economic goals. The interviewees stressed three areas of tension, which highlighted the disputes surrounding the *what*, the *how* and *for whom* of nation branding: (1) the conflicting purposes guiding the practice of nation branding, (2) the difficulties around the operationalisation of nation branding and (3) the controversies regarding the intended audiences for their efforts. The three areas of tension show that nation branding is far from being an orchestrated effort or a neoliberal conspiracy.

Practitioners continuously face struggles in order to construct and project versions of national identity.

Significantly, the issues raised by the interviewees point out how nation branding has severe structural flaws that make the delivery of its promises impossible. I highlight three. Firstly, nation branding advocates promise to create and give visibility to an orderly and unique portrayal of the nation, to make it stand out in the global market. Indeed, in the case of Chile, the interviewees agreed there was consensus that the country was projected predominantly as an economic unit. However, the different aims and agendas of all the organisations trying to develop portrayals of Chile, as well as the pressures they faced from other actors within the state, made the coordination of such portrayals an almost insurmountable task. Secondly, practitioners admitted that they operate on shaky grounds, without clear guidance on how to empirically conduct and evaluate their efforts. With no clear path of operationalisation and the difficulty of reaching consensus in regards to *what* make visible of the nation, when agreement amongst the actors was reached, shallow and unoriginal versions of national identity constituting the 'brand' were put forward. Thirdly, whilst nation branding promises to level the international arena, giving more opportunities to small and medium-sized nations to advance their agendas, in practice it is underpinned on geopolitical visions that reproduce asymmetrical power relations, with 'peripheral' nations struggling to capture the attention of 'core' ones. Furthermore, nation branding provides no answer to more traditional geopolitical concerns, such as territorial sovereignty disputes.

It is quite possible that the significant flaws in nation branding as well as an absence of concrete results will reduce its influence amongst governments in the near future, particularly those from 'emerging' or 'developing' nations. This does not mean that the task of developing portrayals of the nation for foreigners will be abandoned. As stated earlier, the concept of public diplomacy has been increasingly used in Chile, particularly in connection with the fraught relationships with neighbouring countries. Public diplomacy is traditionally understood as a task of ministries of foreign affairs rather than public relations managers. Hence, its practitioners have gained more respectability given

that they are portrayed as part of the diplomatic body of a government rather than as communication consultants or propagandists.¹⁰¹ In practice that reframing may not necessarily be a clear departure from nation branding efforts, given that the term public diplomacy often denominates the very same activities currently carried out by nation branding practitioners.¹⁰² Furthermore, nation branding should be seen more as a manifestation rather than the cause of the increasing understanding of the nation in mostly economic terms, as well as the embracing of branding and advertising language and techniques by the state.¹⁰³ Hence, while the phenomenon of nation branding may soon disappear,¹⁰⁴ the conditions that facilitated its emergence and dissemination remain.

Notes

¹ For further discussion see, for instance, P. Alexandre et al (2015). Brief Analyses of Chilean Geopolitics, in *Coleção Meira Mattos - Revista Das Ciências Militares*, 9(34), 129-145; R. Benedikter & K. Siepmann (Eds.) (2015). *Chile in Transition: Prospects and Challenges for Latin America's Forerunner of Development* (Dordrecht: Springer); R. Ortega (2015), La geopolítica y geoestrategia chilena: ¿presente en el discurso y ausente en la práctica?, in *Cuadernos de Trabajo ANEPE*, 2, 1-19; I. Strodthoff (2014). *Chile and Australia: Contemporary Transpacific Connections from the South* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

² Simon Anholt is often called 'the father' of nation branding, after he coined the term 'nation-brands' in his article Nation-brands of the twenty-first century in 1998. *The Journal of Brand Management*, 5(6), 395–406. Years later, he distanced himself from the concept and preferred to discuss 'competitive identity'. For further details, see S. Anholt (2007), *Competitive identity: The new brand management for nations, cities and regions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

³ See also M. Aronczyk, (2013). *Branding the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

⁴ There have been various examples of op-ed pieces written during the last decades seeking to justify the need for a nation brand for Chile. For example, Y. Gallardo (2015, June 17). Opinión: Caso Vidal, un golpe a la marca Chile. In *El Mostrador*. URL: <http://www.elmostrador.cl/mercados/2015/06/17/opinion-vidal-golpe-a-la-marca-chile/>; M. Gómez (2016, October 27). Promoviendo la marca Chile en Estados Unidos, in *Cooperativa*. URL: <http://opinion.cooperativa.cl/opinion/economia/promoviendo-la-marca-chile-en-estados-unidos/2016-10-27/063806.html>

⁵ See, for instance, E. Chadwick (2015, March 10). Chile y su imagen país: el riesgo de desaparecer del mapa, in *T13*. URL: <http://www.t13.cl/blog/tarjeta-bip/chile-y-su-imagen-pais-el-riesgo-de-desaparecer-del-mapa>; C. Jiménez-Martínez (2013). Chile's quest to improve its image abroad, in *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 9(4), 279–290.

⁶ To give some examples, the case of Chile is referenced in Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); C. Browning, (2015). Nation branding, national self-esteem, and the constitution of subjectivity in late modernity. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 11(2), 195–214; K. Dinnie (2008). *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice* (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann).

⁷ Some significant exceptions being Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); C. Avendaño Manell (2008). *Relaciones estratégicas, comunicación internacional: El caso Chile* (Villa María: Eduvim); M.C. Prieto

Larraín, (2011). *Branding the Chilean Nation. Socio-Cultural Change, National Identity and International Image*. Leiden University, URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/18141>

⁸ See, for example, Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); J. Batora (2005). Public diplomacy of small and medium-sized states: Norway and Canada. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, (97), 1–26, URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20050300_cli_paper_dip_issue97.pdf; G. Bolin & P. Ståhlberg (2010). Between community and commodity: Nationalism and nation branding. In A. Roosvall & I. Salovaara-Moring (Eds.), *Communicating the nation: National topographies of global media landscapes*, pp. 79–101 (Goteborg: Nordicom); I. Hall (2012). India's New Public Diplomacy. *Asian Survey*, 52(6), 1089–1110, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.6.1089>; N. Kaneva (2012). Who can play this game? The rise of nation branding in Bulgaria, 2001–2005. In N. Kaneva (Ed.), *Branding post-communist nations: Marketizing national identities in the “new” Europe*, pp. 99–123 (New York and London: Routledge); N. Kaneva & D. Popescu (2014). “We are Romanian, not Roma”: Nation Branding and Postsocialist Discourses of Alterity. *Communication, Culture & Critique*, 7(4), 506–523; R. Saunders, (2015). Mediating new Europe-Asia: Branding the post-socialist world via the Internet. In J. Morris, N. Rulyova, & V. Strukov (Eds.), *New media in new Europe-Asia*, pp. 143–166 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge); P. Surowiec (2017). *Nation branding, public relations and soft power: Corporatising Poland* (London: Routledge).

⁹ For instance, D. Buarque, (2015). One Country, Two Cups — The International Image of Brazil in 1950 and in 2014: A Study of the Reputation and the Identity of Brazil as Projected by the International Media During the Two FIFA World Cups in the Country. *International Journal of Communication*, 9, 1300–1318, URL: <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/3351/1368>; C. Jiménez-Martínez, (note 5); F. Lossio Chávez, (2014). La necesaria fantasía de la Marca Perú. In G. Portocarrero (Ed.), *Perspectivas sobre el nacionalismo en el Perú*, pp. 23–38 (Lima: Red para el desarrollo de las ciencias sociales en el Perú); Prieto Larraín (note 6); J. Sanin (2016). Colombia was passion: Commercial nationalism and the reinvention of Colombianness. In Z. Volcic & M. Andrejevic (Eds.), *Commercial nationalism: Selling the nation and nationalizing the sell*, pp. 46–64 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); C. Villanueva Rivas (2011). The rise and fall of Mexico's international image: Stereotypical identities, media strategies and diplomacy dilemmas. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 7(1), 23–31.

¹⁰ G. Dijkink (1996). *National identity and geopolitical visions: Maps of pride and pain* (London: Routledge), 11.

¹¹ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); E. Castelló & S. Mihelj (2017). Selling and consuming the nation: Understanding consumer nationalism. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 1–19; N. Kaneva, (2011). Nation Branding: Toward an Agenda for Critical Research. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 117–141, URL: <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/704>; N. Kaneva (2016). Nation branding and commercial nationalism: Notes for a materialist critique. In Z. Volcic & M. Andrejevic (Eds.), *Commercial nationalism: Selling the nation and nationalizing the sell*, pp. 175–193 (London: Palgrave Macmillan); Surowiec, *Nation branding, public relations and soft power: Corporatising Poland* (note 8).

¹² See, for instance, the cases examined in Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Batora (note 8); Bolin & Ståhlberg (note 8); Hall (note 8); Kaneva (note 8); Saunders (note 8); S. Mains (2015). From Bolt to brand: Olympic celebrations, tourist destinations and media landscapes. In S. Mains, J. Cupples & C. Lukinbeal (Eds.), *Mediated geographies and geographies of the media*, pp. 329–348 (Dordrecht: Springer); K. Valaskivi (2013). A brand new future? Cool Japan and the social imaginary of the branded nation. In *Japan Forum*, 25(4), 485–504; S. Wood (2017). Rebranding the nation: Germany's image politics. In *International Politics*, 54(2), 161–181. The list is not by any means comprehensive.

¹³ S. Anholt. *Competitive identity* (note 2); W. Olins (2002). Branding the nation: The historical context. *Journal of Brand Management*, 9(4/5), 241–249; P. van Ham, (2001). The rise of the brand state: The postmodern politics of image and reputation. *Foreign Affairs*, 80(5), 2–6.

¹⁴ Van Ham (note 13), 3.

¹⁵ C. Marklund (2016). The Nordic Model on the Global Market of Ideas: The Welfare State as Scandinavia's Best Brand. *Geopolitics*, 1–17.

¹⁶ Kaneva (note 11)

¹⁷ See, for instance, Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 8); Bolin & Ståhlberg (note 8); G. Bolin & P. Ståhlberg (2015). Mediating the Nation-State: Agency and the Media in Nation-Branding Campaigns. *International Journal of Communication*, 9, 3065–3083; Browning (note 4); Castelló & Mihelj (note 11); Kaneva (note 6 and 9); Kaneva & Popescu (note 8); Saunders (note 6); Surowiec, *Nation branding, public relations and soft power: Corporatising Poland* (note 8); Z. Volcic, & M. Andrejevic (2011). Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism. *International Journal of Communication*, 5(1), 598–618, URL: <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/849/544>.

¹⁸ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Kaneva (notes 8 and 11).

¹⁹ For instance, Kaneva has used the concept of visibility to examine the mediated construction of femininity in post-socialist nations, in N. Kaneva (2015) Mediating Post-Socialist Femininities, *Feminist Media Studies*, 15(1), 1-17.

²⁰ Volcic & Andrejevic (note 17), p. 604.

²¹ J.B. Thompson, 'The new visibility', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 22/6 (2005), pp. 31-51.

²² Ibid, p. 49.

²³ O. Voirol (2005). Les Luites pour la Visibilité - Esquisse d'une problématique. *La Découverte, Réseaux*, 1(129–130), 89–121.

²⁴ Dayan, D. (2013). Conquering visibility, conferring visibility: Visibility seekers and media performance. *International Journal of Communication*, 7, 137–153, URL: <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1966/845>, p. 139.

²⁵ S. Anholt. *Competitive identity* (note 2); K. Dinnie. *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice* (note 6); W. Olins (note 13); Szondi, G. (2008). Public diplomacy and nation branding: Conceptual similarities and differences. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20081022_pap_in_dip_nation_branding.pdf

²⁶ G. Dijkink (1996). *National identity and geopolitical visions: Maps of pride and pain* (note 10).

²⁷ A. Brighenti (2010). *Visibility in social theory and social research* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

²⁸ M. Foucault (1979). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (Harmondsworth: Penguin), p. 200.

²⁹ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Browning (note 6); S.C. Jansen (2008). Designer nations: Neo-liberal nation branding – Brand Estonia. *Social Identities*, 14(1), 121–142; N. Kaneva (2012). Nation branding in post-communist Europe: Identities, markets, and democracy. In *Branding post-communist nations: Marketizing national identities in the "new" Europe*, pp. 3–22 (New York: Routledge).

³⁰ Brighenti. *Visibility in social theory and social research* (note 22), p. 58.

³¹ S. Banet-Weiser (2015). Keynote address: Media, markets, gender: Economies of visibility in a neoliberal moment. *The Communication Review*, 18(1), 53–70; see also N. Kaneva (note 19).

³² Banet-Weiser (note 31).

³³ Based on Dayan (note 24); Voirol (note 23).

³⁴ Voirol (note 23), p. 102.

³⁵ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Bolin & Ståhlberg (note 8); Kaneva (note 11); L. Kulcsár & Y.-O. Yum (2012). One nation, one brand? Nation branding and identity reconstruction in post-communist Hungary. In N. Kaneva (Ed.), *Branding post-communist nations: Marketizing national identities in the "new" Europe*, pp. 193–212, (London: Routledge); Surowiec, *Nation branding, public relations and soft power: Corporatising Poland* (note 8).

³⁶ Kaneva (note 11), p. 177.

³⁷ G. Turner (2016). Setting the scene for commercial nationalism: The nation, the market, and the media. In Z. Volcic & M. Andrejevic (Eds.), *Commercial nationalism: Selling the nation and nationalizing the sell*, pp. 14–26 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

³⁸ See Buarque, (note 9); Jiménez-Martínez (note 5); Lossio Chávez, (note 9); Prieto Larraín (note 7); Sanin (note 9); Villanueva Rivas (note 9).

³⁹ For further details, see P. Álvarez Caselli (2009). Chile MR: la difícil ecuación histórica entre identidad, imagen y marca-país. *Revista DISEÑA*, 1, 50–61. Retrieved from <http://www.revistadisena.com/chile-mr-la-dificil-ecuacion-historica-entre-identidad-imagen-y-marca-pais/>; J. Itzigsohn & M. vom Hau (2006). Unfinished imagined communities: States, social movements, and nationalism in Latin America. *Theory and Society*, 35(2), 193–212; J. Larraín, (2000). *Identity and modernity in Latin America* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press).

⁴⁰ Larraín. *Identity and modernity in Latin America* (note 39).

⁴¹ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Dijkink (1996). *National identity and geopolitical visions: Maps of pride and pain* (note 10).

⁴² Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Kaneva, (note 11); Kaneva & D. Popescu (note 8)

⁴³ Álvarez Caselli (note 39).

⁴⁴ C. Macario (1998). *Chile: De las políticas de subsidio a las exportaciones a las políticas de desarrollo de la competitividad*. Santiago. Retrieved from <http://archivo.cepal.org/pdfs/1998/S9800548.pdf>

⁴⁵ Prieto Larraín (note 7).

⁴⁶ J. Abarca Lucero (2009). Public diplomacy and qualitative jump: The case of Chile. *Tripodos*, 24, 53–61. Retrieved from <http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Tripodos/article/view/129434/178817>; Jiménez-Martínez (note 5); Prieto Larraín (note 7).

⁴⁷ Abarca Lucero (note 46); Prieto Larraín (note 7).

⁴⁸ Anholt (note 2).

⁴⁹ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).

⁵⁰ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Jiménez-Martínez, (note 5).

⁵¹ Jiménez-Martínez (note 5).

⁵² Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); Bakit, M. (2014, November 8). Canciller Heraldo Muñoz explica la renovada estrategia de Imagen de Chile: Nueva “Marca País” pondrá énfasis en relación vecinal y reformas. *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile*, URL: <http://www.minrel.gov.cl/minrel/site/artic/20141111/pags/2014111111516.html>; Jiménez-Martínez, (note 4); R. Merino (2010, November 10). Chile hace bien. In *Marca Chile*, URL: <https://marcachile.cl/noticias/chile-hace-bien/>; ProChile (n.d.). Chile hace bien, URL: http://www.prochile.gob.cl/int/peru/wp-content/blogs.dir/42/files_mf/1384869827FichaChileEsp.pdf

⁵³ L. Chagas de Moura, (2013). *A Marca Brasil: O poder da imagem e a construção da identidade competitiva*. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Brasília, Brasil.

⁵⁴ The interviews were with “David”, from ProChile in 2013; “Marcela”, from *Fundación Imagen de Chile*, in 2013; “Pedro”, from Ogilvy Public Relations, in 2014; “Rodrigo”, from Ogilvy Public Relations, in 2014; “Fernando”, from *Fundación Imagen de Chile*, in 2014; “Carlos”, from ProChile, in 2016; “Diego”, from FutureBrand, in 2016.

⁵⁵ J. Attride-Stirling (2001). Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research. *Qualitative Research*, 1(3), 385–405; J. Fereday, & E. Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). Demonstrating rigor using thematic analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme development. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 5(1), 80–92; Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9), 1277–1288.

⁵⁶ Castelló & Mihelj (note 11); Kaneva (note 11); Volcic & Andrejevic (note 17); Volcic, Z., & Andrejevic, M. (2015). Introduction. In Z. Volcic & M. Andrejevic (Eds.), *Commercial nationalism: Selling the nation and nationalizing the sell*, pp. 1–13, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

⁵⁷ Abarca Lucero (note 49); Álvarez Caselli (note 39); Dinnie. *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice* (note 6); Prieto Larraín (note 7).

⁵⁸ T. Nairn (1997). *Faces of nationalism: Janus revisited* (London: Verso). For an examination of the tension between tradition and modernity in Latin America, see N. García Canclini (2001). *Consumers and citizens: Globalization and multicultural conflicts* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

⁵⁹ See the examples in Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).

⁶⁰ Various authors, such as Álvarez Caselli (note 39); Jiménez-Martínez (note 5) have also mentioned the story that David recalled.

⁶¹ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).

⁶² This paradox is further examined in C. Ooi (2004). Poetics and Politics of Destination Branding: Denmark. *Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism*, 4(2), 107–128.

⁶³ See <https://marcachile.cl/english/the-brand-chile/>

⁶⁴ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).

⁶⁵ See, for instance, Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3) and Lossio Chávez (note 9).

⁶⁶ D. Dayan, (2008). Beyond media events: Disenchantment, derailment, disruption. In M. E. Price & D. Dayan (Eds.), *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the new China*, pp. 391–403 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), p. 392.

⁶⁷ Among the many works in this field, I can mention Anholt. *Competitive identity* (note 2); K. Dinnie. *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice* (note 6); L. Echeverri, C. Estay-Niculcar, C. Herrera & J. Santamaría (2013). Desarrollo de marca país y turismo: El caso de estudio de México, *Estudios y perspectivas en turismo*, 22(6), 1121-1139; Olins (note 13). For a more comprehensive review, please refer to Kaneva (note 11).

⁶⁸ Anholt. *Competitive identity* (note 2).

⁶⁹ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).

⁷⁰ The video is available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZq4N5ekKD8>

⁷¹ L. Moor (2007). *The rise of brands* (London: Bloomsbury).

⁷² M. Power (2000), 'The audit society – second thoughts', *International Journal of Auditing*, 4/1, pp. 111-119. See also M. Power et al (2009), 'Reputational risk as a logic of organizing in late modernity', *Organization Studies*, 30/2-3, pp. 301-324.

⁷³ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).

⁷⁴ S. Anholt. *Competitive identity* (note 2).

⁷⁵ Available at <http://www.livingatlaschile.com/>

⁷⁶ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3), 134.

⁷⁷ Based on Ooi (note 62).

⁷⁸ A critical examination of this argument can be found in Marklund, p.3 (note 15); Turner (note 37).

⁷⁹ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3); see also, A. Kantola (2010). The disciplined imaginary: The nation rejuvenated for the global condition. In A. Roosvall & I. Salovaara-Moring (Eds.), *Communicating the nation: National topographies of global media landscapes*, pp. 237–254 (Goteborg: Nordicom); M. Kunczik (2002). Globalisation: News media, images of nations and the flow of international capital with special reference to the role of rating agencies. *Journal of International Communication*, 8(1), 39–79.

⁸⁰ The rankings are available at <http://nation-brands.gfk.com/> and <http://www.futurebrand.com/country-brand-index>

⁸¹ Based on Brighenti. *Visibility in social theory and social research* (note 27).

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).

⁸⁴ See I. Wallerstein (2004). *World-systems analysis: An introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press).

⁸⁵ See <http://www.gfk.com/es-cl/insights/press-release/ranking-anholt-nation-brand-index-latam/>; <http://cbramericalatina.com/en/>

⁸⁶ See Anholt. *Competitive identity* (note 2); Dinnie. *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice* (note 6); Olins (note 13).

⁸⁷ P.G. Cerny (2010). The competition state today: From raison d'État to raison du Monde. *Policy Studies*, 31(1), 5–21, pp. 6.

⁸⁸ See <http://www.gfk.com/es-cl/insights/press-release/ranking-anholt-nation-brand-index-latam/>

⁸⁹ See <http://cbramericalatina.com/en/>

⁹⁰ For example, in 2012 the Chilean tourism board put a series of posters in Lima's main airports. Those posters were taken down after the Peruvian media reported that residents were supposedly unhappy to see the Chilean ads. See C. Cáceres (2012, May 12). Sacan publicidad de Chile en aeropuerto de Lima para "evitar conflictos", in *Emol*, URL: <http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2012/05/10/539914/gobierno-retira-publicidad-turistica-de-chile-en-aeropuerto-de-lima-para-evitar-conflicto.html>

⁹¹ Bakit (note 52).

⁹² Jiménez-Martínez (note 5); Prieto Larraín (note 7).

⁹³ D. Aguirre Azócar & J. Villalobos (2016). La ofensiva de Bolivia y Chile y la diplomacia pública mediada. *Relaciones Internacionales*, 89(2), 17–46; J.I. Brito (2015, July 30). Diplomacia pública. In *La Tercera*, URL: <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/diplomacia-publica/>; R. Jara (2015, October 7). Juicio en La Haya: La "batalla" comunicacional entre Chile y Bolivia tras el fallo de la Corte. In *Emol*, URL: <http://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2015/10/06/753232/Juicio-en-La-Haya-La-batalla-comunicacional-entre-Chile-y-Bolivia-tras-el-fallo-de-la-Corte.html>

⁹⁴ Brito (note 93); Jiménez-Martínez (note 5).

⁹⁵ van Ham (note 13).

⁹⁶ Bakit (note 52).

⁹⁷ Aguirre Azócar & Villalobos (note 93).

⁹⁸ Theorists and practitioners have proposed competing definition of what nation branding and public diplomacy are. For example, see Kaneva (note 11); E. Gilboa (2008) Searching for a theory of public diplomacy, in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 55-77; G. Szondi (2008) Public diplomacy and nation branding: conceptual similarities and differences, in *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', October 2008; Volcic, & Andrejevic (note 14).

⁹⁹ Thompson (note 21).

¹⁰⁰ Based on Brighenti. *Visibility in social theory and social research* (note 27).

¹⁰¹ American diplomat Edmund Gullion proposed the current meaning of public diplomacy in 1965. He was looking for a term to describe the activities carried out by the American government aimed at foreign publics during the Cold War. The most obvious choice was 'propaganda', but the negative associations carried by this word caused him to discard it. The choice of a new concept was not only a matter of semantics. It also legitimised and raised the status of this 'new' practice. Public diplomacy practitioners gained more respectability because they were associated with diplomats rather than with public relations professionals; the concept justified the creation or empowerment of institutions exclusively dedicated to this task, such as the United States Information Agency; and it facilitated the task of differentiating these activities from similar ones carried out by the enemy, claiming that, while the United States was doing public diplomacy, the Soviet Union was misleading people and hiding the truth through propagandistic machinery. For further details see G. Cowan, N. Cull (2008) Public Diplomacy in a changing world, in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 6-8; N. Cull (2008) Public Diplomacy: taxonomies and histories, in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 31-54; N. Cull (2008) Public Diplomacy before Guillion: the evolution of a phrase, in N.

Snow, P. Taylor (Eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, pp. 19-23 (New York: Routledge); J. Melissen (2005). The new public diplomacy: between theory and practice, in Melissen, J. (Ed.) *The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations*, pp. 3-27 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); J. Pamment (2013) *New public diplomacy in the 21st century: a comparative study of policy and practice* (London: Routledge).

¹⁰² See note 98.

¹⁰³ Castelló & Mihelj (note 11); Kaneva (note 11); Moor. *The rise of brands* (note 71).

¹⁰⁴ Based on Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation* (note 3).